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Abstract
Since Arrow (1962), spillovers from pioneer to follower in non-excludable innovations are
central to our understanding of endogenous economic growth. Nonetheless, evidence of these
spillovers in less-developed economies has been elusive. Our paper contributes by showing
novel facts consistent with externalities in new export products. To avoid biases towards
ex-post successes, we use data on the universe of customs transactions from Chile (1990-
2006). We ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, follower ﬁrms are more likely to enter a product if the pioneer ﬁrm
survives exporting. More importantly, we also ﬁnd that pioneers enter and remain smaller than
followers, which is indicative that the ﬁrst exporter may not be the ﬁrm that beneﬁts the most
from the discovery. This fact is inconsistent with the currently standard view in international
trade, in which the largest ﬁrm would be the ﬁrst willing to pay a homogeneous sunk cost of
exporting. In contrast, our facts are consistent with the view that smaller pioneer exporters
are data producers, whose spillovers beneﬁt larger followers. We oﬀer a simple model to
formalize this intuition, based on the idea that large exporters have more choices on how to
allocate their managerial capacity. This real option makes large exporters wait, as to assign
their marginal manager on the best possible project. In contrast, smaller and more focused
ﬁrms prefer to be pioneers.
JEL classiﬁcation : L26 ; F14; O4.
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1 Introduction
The emergence of new export products has been associated with economic accelerations in less-
developed economies (Lucas, 1993; Kehoe and Ruhl, 2009; Amsden, 1992). In this context, it is
relevant to explore whether the process of new product discovery is fully internalized by ﬁrms
or, in contrast, displays some type of external economies.
In particular, since Arrow (1962), spillovers from pioneer to followers in non-excludable innovations
have been central to our understanding of endogenous economic growth1. Many authors since then
(e.g. Bardhan, 1971; Hoﬀ, 1997; Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003) appealed to this idea to explain
why less developing countries have diﬃculties reallocating factors into activities with potential
comparative advantage. The basic idea in these theories is that pioneers in new products are data
producers (Schumpeter, 1934), from which the subsequent followers beneﬁt. The problem is that
pioneers do not internalize the full social beneﬁt of the information they create. As a result, there
would be an underprovision of incentives to experiment in a new product. Our goal in this paper is
to empirically explore these pioneer-follower externalities, in the context of an emerging market's
new export products. But since learning is not directly observable, we oﬀer a simple model that
can rationalize our stylized facts as consistent with a product discovery externality.
Despite the theoretical plausibility, the empirical evidence on spillovers from pioneer to followers
has been harder to develop. The diﬃculty arises from the minimum data requirements to explore
the issue on a broad base. This data needs to be: (i) at ﬁrm-product level, so we can distinguish ﬁrm
behavior from industry behavior; (ii) in new products/processes, where there is both something
new to learn2 and it is possible to identify the early sequence of entry; (iii) on the widest possible
universe of products, to avoid hindsight biases towards ex post successful cases. Existing empirical
studies, discussed below, usually lack one or more of these attributes. A notable exception is the
proliﬁc line of research pioneered by Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993), testing geographic
spillovers in patent citation on a wide variety of industries. But looking at patents does not seem
useful to understand how emerging or developing economies catch up by adopting oﬀ-the frontier
innovations3 . Our paper is precisely an eﬀort to understand some of these non-patent spillovers in
1More recent models like Romer (1990) re-launched the idea that the non-excludable portion of innovations can
be behind endogenous growth.
2In their Handbook chapter, Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare (2010) are probably the most recent review of models
of externalities in new products in less developed economies. Rosenthal and Strange (2006)compile evidence on
agglomeration spillovers, but we could not ﬁnd in their paper any evidence for new tradable products in less
developed economies. In developing countries agriculture there has been a recent literature looking at externalities.
One take home of this literature, as remarked by Foster and Rosenzweig (2010), is that to statistically ﬁnd some
learning there ought to be something new to learn. For example Duﬂo, Kremer, and Robinson (2009) do not ﬁnd
learning across ﬁrms in fertilization of old crops in Kenya. In contrast, for the new and unknown pineapple crop
in Ghana, Conley and Udry (2010) can distinguish learning across ﬁrms. The spirit of our empirical strategy is
precisely to focus only on new products, to see whether we can ﬁnd evidence of learning ﬂowing from the pioneer
to the follower.
3In fact, Jaﬀe, Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) recognize that [...] there are an enormous number of
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new export products, by using a method that in principle can be extended to other less-developed
economies. 4
Our ﬁrst step to study the behavior of pioneers and followers was to build a dataset of arguably
all new export products from Chile, using detailed transaction level data from Chilean Customs
(1990-2006) and other sources. To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst paper looking at
spillovers using data that meets all three previously outlined attributes: ﬁrm level data in a wide
variety of new products classiﬁed according to standard nomeclature. Other features of our data
seem particularly suitable for our purposes. For example, Chile is a small open economy, so its
ﬁrms are plausibly price takers in international markets5. This arguably simpliﬁes the strategic
interaction among them in our sample, allowing us to focus mostly on the decision to export.
We provide two main results consistent with the view that followers beneﬁt from pioneers in the
early stages of new export products. First, the survival of pioneers is positively correlated with
entry of followers, which is a plausible prerequisite to think that followers learn from the successes
or failures of pioneers. More importantly, our second ﬁnding is that pioneers enter and remain
smaller in size than followers, even if we control for unobserved shocks to products in a year.
This ﬁrst mover disadvantage is inconsistent with extensions of currently standard international
trade models (e.g. Melitz, 2003), in which the largest ﬁrm is the ﬁrst willing to pay a constant
sunk cost to enter into exporting. While this selection eﬀect captures well the steady state of
exports, in which larger ﬁrms become exporters6, it does not ﬁt the early dynamics of our new
export products. Our point is this paper is that the beginning of a new export product is diﬀerent
from a simple extrapolation of the steady state.
In fact, our stylized facts are consistent with the view that smaller pioneer exporters are data
producers and beneﬁt larger followers. We formalize this intuition in a simple model in which
larger exporters also have a wider set of potential new projects to pursue. Since they cannot develop
all of them because of decreasing returns to scope, their problem is to allocate an indivisible scarce
spillovers with no citations, since only a small fraction of research output is ever patented.
4Another approach, without having ﬁrm level data, has been to use aggregate country-level adoption of particular
technologies (Comin and Hobijn, 2004), or the country-level discovery of new export products (Hausmann and
Rodrik, 2003; Hidalgo, Klinger, Barabasi, and Hausmann, 2007; Klinger and Lederman, 2004) Unlike these macro-
level papers, we use ﬁrm-product data trying to understand whether the adoption is a spillover across ﬁrms or
simply a single ﬁrm increasing its size. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) argue that this is a crucial distinction
for our understanding of market failures. They argue that if a pioneer ﬁrm has the potential to grow very large, it
can internalize the industry level learning. Indeed, if ﬁrms have constant returns to scale then many models that
justify policy base on increasing returns (the canonical model of Helpman and Krugman (1985)[p55] , or Bhagwati
et al. (1971) ) no longer work. Interestingly, our results clearly show that the pioneer ﬁrm has not only a lower than
100% market share in exports from the country in the product, but also that it is smaller than followers. Thus, our
results clearly go against the core assumption of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010), and suggests a probable case
for market failures in new exports. Nonetheless, our ﬁnal results about large scale producers is more suggestive of
the kind of argument defended in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2010); although our setting is diﬀerent, because
we only explore the exporting of a product, not its production.
5We test our main results also for the subsample of cases where Chile has less than 30% market share in the
import destination, and we still get that pioneers end up being smaller than followers.
6See for example Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998); Bernard and Jensen (1999)
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resource (e.g. a new manager) to the best possible use. The extra potential scope, vis-a-vis smaller
and more focused ﬁrms, generates a real option that makes larger ﬁrms strategically delay entry.
In contrast, smaller exporters with fewer options tend to enter sooner, revealing information to
followers about product proﬁtability. In short, followers free-ride on the pioneer's eﬀort.
The mechanism outlined above is a novel explanation for why ﬁrst movers might end up being
smaller players, which is a central topic in Business Strategy (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988,
1998). In particular, the standard forces that rationalize why the second fast is larger than the
pioneer do not seem to apply in many of our products (Markides and Geroski, 2005). For example
the cannibalization problems discussed by Aron and Lazear (1990) look less relevant to explain why
larger exporters do not enter as pioneers, since our ﬁrms export to a large international market,
in which the price is more likely to be exogenous to the behavior of Chilean ﬁrms. Similarly, the
products we analyze are well advanced in their product life cycle, so it seems unlikely that the
optimal organizational form is to separate the R&D stage from the production stage as suggested
by Aghion and Tirole (1994). Our theoretical mechanism helps us also rationalize the tendency of
larger and diversiﬁed organizations to pay less attention to innovative opportunities, as shown by
Seru (2007) and Bresnahan, Greenstein, and Henderson (2010).
Our third and ﬁnal result challenges the idea that externalities are commonplace across all prod-
ucts. In fact, in more than half of the new products with sustained pioneers7, we do not observe
follower ﬁrms, even in cases where we have anecdotal information consistent with positive proﬁts.
When early entrants enjoy a large ﬁrst mover advantage that preemt further entry, as in Krug-
man (1980), it is less plausible to argue in favor of within product learning externalities. We also
ﬁnd some support for the idea that in goods with large scale of production, in which the pioneer
becomes a natural monopoly in the domestic market, it is less likely to observe entry of followers.
This can also be interpreted in our model. When there is a single potential exporter of a product,
there is no reason for this ﬁrm to delay the export experiment, because it can fully internalize all
the beneﬁts from this risky endeavor.
From an empirical perspective, we are most closely related to papers exploring spillovers. In
general, the literature that documents these externalities uses industry cases, normally biased
towards successful cases or industries that grew ex-post (Porter, 1990, 1998; Chandra, 2006; Freund
and Pierola, 2009; Agosin and Bravo-Ortega, 2009; Da Rocha, Monteiro, Kury, and Darzé, 2008;
Conley and Udry, 2010; Mostafa and Klepper, 2010). These cases are of course interesting, but
their methodology underweights the overall failure and uncertainty present in the development of
new export products, which is ex-ante very important for international entrepreneurs. In contrast,
we include both successful and unsuccessful cases, because we have access to the universe of
7One possibility is that they continue because the sunk cost is paid , not because it is a good project from an
ex ante perspective. Although we do not observe ﬁrms proﬁts for our sample, so we cannot claim that the NPV of
the project was positive, we studied three cases of lonely pioneers that claimed to pay back easily their investment
and then continued exporting alone.
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transactions and goods for the period we study8. Additionally, we provide what we believe is
a more reliable deﬁnition of new products. Recent papers have used short run deﬁnitions for
new products (Freund and Pierola, 2009; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2010) 9. In contrast, our longer
panel allows us to take a pre-sample of ﬁve years without exports to classify a product as new.
This reduces the proportion of old products that are intermittently exported and that may be
missclassifed as new. Unsurprisingly, we get quite diﬀerent results from the two papers above.
Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) ﬁnd many pioneers exporting new products from Mexico to the
US immediately after NAFTA in 1994. Moreover, they ﬁnd that the largest exporters entered
ﬁrst, according to their timeline. In contrast, in our sample of new products we almost always ﬁnd
a single pioneer launching a product the ﬁrst year, and this pioneer tends not to be the ex-post
largest exporter10.
Our research can also be thought of as an oﬀspring of the new new international economics with
heterogeneous ﬁrms (a-la Melitz, 2003), particularly of models with multiproduct ﬁrms such as
Nocke and Yeaple (2006); Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006) ; Eckel and Neary (2010) and
Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2010). In this literature, the largest and highest productivity
ﬁrms export more products and are the most willing to pay a sunk cost to export new products.
Since we do not ﬁnd support for the prediction that larger exporters enter ﬁrst, we oﬀer a model
to understand why these larger exporters delay experimenting. Within this trade literature on
experimentation, we are related to Rauch and Watson (2003); Ruhl and Willis (2009); Albornoz,
Corcos, Ornelas, and Pardo (2010); Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008) and Eaton, Eslava,
Krizan, Kugler, and Tybout (2010).
Finally, we are closely related to the innovation strategy literature on how the ﬁrst mover keeps
its original advantage (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982; Henderson, 1993; Prusa and Schmitz, 1994).
We share with this literature the special focus on the sequencing of entry. However, we consider
products that are well within the international frontier of innovation and largely non-patentable. In
that sense our paper is also an empirical contribution to the International Marketing literature11.
8By universe we mean all reported products' exports using the product deﬁnition of Customs: the Harmonized
System at 6 digit level. Our data does not include services.
9For example, Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) deﬁne a new product as a product that was not exported by the
country only for one year. Freund et al call a new product to any code that was not exported at the ﬁrst year of
their sample period (1994) and that was exported for at least 3 consecutive periods after 1994.
10Regarding data, we use similar datasets as various descriptive papers that look at the dynamics of products,
ﬁrms and destinations in exports. Our main diﬀerence with them is that they do not take the perspective of new
export products (Eaton, Eslava, Kugler, and Tybout, 2007, 2008; Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz, 2004; Besedes and
Prusa, 2006a,b). Other authors have looked at Chilean Data to explore patterns of trade. For example, Isabel
Marshall (1991) explored industry eﬃciency after trade liberalization in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see also
Pavcnik, 2002, presented an inﬂuential paper on the same question). In many contributions, Roberto Alvarez and
various co-authors have been describing the diﬀerent patterns of Chilean exporters and manufacturers in diﬀerent
ways. (Alvarez and Fuentes, 2009; Alvarez, 2007; Alvarez and Crespi, 2000; Alvarez and Lopez, 2005; Alvarez
and Görg, 2009; Alvarez, Faruq, and Lopez, 2007; Alvarez, 2004). Macchiavello (2009) explores the duration of
relationships between Chilean wineries and foreign buyers.
11Various papers focus on the covariates, like age, of the decision to internationalize the production of a ﬁrm (for
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 oﬀers a simple theoretical framework
to clarify thinking about experimentation and entry into new exports. It is important to remark
that the predictions it delivers are not unique to this model, but are shared with a broader set
of explanations that involve external economies across ﬁrms in a product. We are aware that the
model is not completely general to interpret the evidence. The point is that, unlike in friction-
less markets, there are many potential ways in which learning can happen. We do not hope to
encompass all of these possible channels. Instead, we simply focus on a single parsimonius model
as an instrumental lens to read the evidence. Section 3 explains and describes our dataset of
new export products, also discussing a few canonical examples as a way to ﬁx ideas. Section 4
empirically explores the predictions of our formal framework. Section 5 argues against alternative
interpretations to our stylized facts, especially focusing on discarding explanations that do not
involve learning. Section 6 concludes with some remarks.
2 A model of strategic waiting by a large exporter
This section oﬀers a simple model with a novel mechanism that induces larger exporters to delay
entry. The idea is that, at the margin, larger ﬁrms have more choices on where to allocate their
limited capacity to develop new projects. By entering late into riskier endeavors, large ﬁrms have
the advantage of learning about the relative proﬁtability of diﬀerent new activities. This facilitates
the allocation of managerial talent to the best possible project. We appeal to two assumptions
to deliver this result. First is that larger ﬁrms tend also to have wider scope, in the sense that
they have more real options of what new projects to undertake. This correlation between size of
shipments and scope has been well known at least since Penrose (1959) and recently documented
by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006) and Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2010). Moreover, in
section 3 we show empirically that later entrants into exporting a product have on average more
economic activities, measured by ISIC industry classiﬁcation. The second core assumption is that
size and scope do not develop overnight in ﬁrms. They grow one step at a time. We also assume
the allocation of resources to a new activity is partially irreversible, which generates an endogenous
sunk cost for large ﬁrms.
In short, while a small ﬁrm faces a single sunk cost of product discovery, a large ﬁrm entering early
a review see Andersen, 1993). More recently, this literature has made a distinction between born globals that
internationalize immediately, from other gradual globals that internationalize after some years in the domestic
market (Moen and Servais, 2002) or in regional markets (Lopez, Kundu, and Ciravegna, 2009). Our diﬀerent with
this literature is the broad coverage of products and the sequence of entry. Other papers in international marketing
empirically explore the order of entry (sequencing) as a determinant of proﬁtability in a given market. For example
Cui and Lui (2005) look at how early entrant multinationals in China do vis-a-vis late entrants in the same market.
Magnusson, Westjohn, and Boggs (2009) look at how sequence of entry aﬀect proﬁtability in many destination
markets, but only for multinationals in the advertisement industry. Our analysis is diﬀerent from this literature
because we focus on many industries and mostly on the source country rather than on the destination country.
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into a new product faces two types of sunk costs. The ﬁrst is a standard exogenous sunk cost,
which is equal for all ﬁrms. The second is an endogenous cost, exclusively faced by large exporters,
because entering early burns the real option to allocate the manager into another activity; related
to the arguments in Dixit and Pindick (1994).
2.1 Setup
Our partial equilibrium setup involves three risk neutral strategic players, which want to maximize
the net present value of net cash ﬂows. Two of the ﬁrms are small and have narrow scope, and the
third ﬁrm is larger and has a wider scope.
On the one hand there are two small ﬁrms with narrow-scope, called A and B, which have a
choice between doing business as usual or starting a new independent risky project. Firm A is
an agricultural ﬁrm and already exports some few agricultural products in which it makes proﬁts
normalized to zero. Firm A can only make one risky new export innovation close to its core
competence, which we call Asparagus. Analogously, ﬁrm B is in the bath apparels industry, and
can decide whether to export a new product, Bathtubs, or not. Both symmetric narrow scope
ﬁrms export a small quantity q, deﬁned exogenously given the ﬁrm's type. As noted, we will abuse
notation by using the same letter to denote both the product (e.g. Asparagus) and the small ﬁrm
that has the option to export it (ﬁrm A).
On the other hand we have a single large ﬁrm, that can export a large quantity q¯ > q. Although
this ﬁrm is also constrained to have a single new activity, because otherwise it hits its diseconomies
of scope, its decision problem is diﬀerent than for small ﬁrms. In particular, the large ﬁrm can
choose to start either Asparagus or Bathtubs, but not both. As discussed above, the assumption
is that the large ﬁrm cannot fully diversify overnight which is consistent with Khanna and Yafeh
(2007). They argue that diversiﬁed ﬁrms grow one step at a time because they need to accumulate
some kind of organizational capital that allows them to increase the scope without aﬀecting the
other inframarginal business lines. 12
The game has three periods, collapsing all future proﬁts in the last period. The available alterna-
tives for ﬁrms are: (i) enter as pioneer in the new product after paying a sunk cost F per unit of
capacity; (ii) enter as follower in the new product also paying the sunk cost; (iii) never enter and
remain with utility normalized to zero. Those who enter the new product can decide whether to re-
main in them or not. The only uncertainty faced by potential entrants in each product i = {A,B}
12In a richer model the restriction on a single new activity at the margin can be though as the result of endogenous
investment in scope with convex costs of adjustment. For this model, however, we take a simple approach and assume
that actual scope N is accumulated at an exogenous rate of one every decade or so, according to Nt+k = Nt + 1
where this is the N is the total number of activities (i.e. product, destination , processes) that a ﬁrm can handle
before hitting the ceiling of diseconomies of scope, and k would be a decade. In family ﬁrms, for example, this
additional managerial capacity can be thought as a new son/daughter available to be a manager.
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is the proﬁtability of the product in the international market, xi. Thus, gross proﬁts, without
investment cost, is max {0, xi − c}; where c is the variable cost of production, which is assumed
homogeneous across ﬁrms and products. We will treat xi as a price, although conceptually it can
represent other product level uncertainty. All the ﬁrms that consider entering a new product i face
the same probability distribution for the unit revenue of their new product, xi. Two reasons make
this assumption of constant prices across ﬁrms in a product plausible . First, Chile is a small open
economy, which makes it less likely that ﬁrms can impact the international prices of products.
Second, in section 5 we empirically show that the prices received by ﬁrms in a product do not
statistically diﬀer between the entry of pioneers and that of followers. In the model the realization
of xi varies across products and is distributed i.i.d. according to G (x
i), which for tractability is
assumed to be a standard uniform distribution, between zero and one. The exogenous sunk cost
F is assumed small enough with respect to Emax {0, xi − c}, so the choice problem is not trivial.
The extensive form of the game for each ﬁrm is shown in Figure 1. At stage 1 a ﬁrm decides
whether to enter immediately, paying a sunk cost F per unit of capacity, or to wait. Immediately
after t = 1, the presence of at least one pioneer ﬁrm in product i reveals to everybody the value
xi. Having that information, the pioneer can decide to continue until period 2 and collect proﬁts ,
which will happen if xi > c. Alternatively, the pioneer can exit the new export product. For those
ﬁrms that waited, the revelation of xi can either induce them to enter as a follower in period 2
and collect proﬁts in period 3. Alternatively, a ﬁrm that waited at t = 1 can choose at t = 2 to
never enter. For a pioneer ﬁrm, in period 3 there is nothing interesting. This period is used only
for waiting ﬁrms, in order to keep the same NPV at entry using the discount factor β ∈ (0, 1).
[Figure 1 about here]
2.2 How do ﬁrms choose.
We will analyze the decision problem for both small and large ﬁrms
2.2.1 Small (narrow-scope) ﬁrm
The choices are symmetric for each small ﬁrm i ∈ {A,B}. For them being a pioneer entails the
beneﬁt of one extra period of proﬁts if the product is successful, but they also incur in an exogenous
sunk cost of exporting, Fq, that may not pay back13. Alternatively, the ﬁrm can wait until next
period, losing one period of potential gross proﬁts, but being sure about the magnitude of them:
13We make the unconventional assumption that sunk cost are proportional to the size of the operation. This
captures the intuition that large ﬁrms may have a higher opportunity cost of resources if they fail since their
operations tend to be larger in whatever they do. They exact proportionality is a useful assumption to reduce the
mathematical burden and keep the model with a single moving part. The results can be generalized for deviations
from this proportionality assumption in the ﬁxed cost.
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max {0, xi − c} q. This certainty that another ﬁrm will enter and publically reveals xi is an extreme
belief, representing the most tempting situation in which the small ﬁrm would prefer to wait. In
the appendix we show that this assumed extreme belief is a sensible simpliﬁcation, without loss
of generality for our parameters of interest. By backward induction, the two value functions in
period 1 are :
V small ipioneer = −Fq + βEmax
{
0,
[
xi − c] q} (1)
V small iwait = βEmax
{
0,−Fq + β [xi − c] q} (2)
In the equilibrium of interest, small ﬁrms will prefer to enter because there are no other ﬁrms
besizes the large ﬁrm, and the latter will prefer to delay, as it will become clear in 2.3..
2.2.2 Large (wide-scope) ﬁrm.
For the large ﬁrm the dynamic problem is the same as when it enters as pioneer, but diﬀerent if
it waits. Although it can introduce only one additional product at a time, it has also wider range
of alternatives between A and B (i.e. arg maxi∈{A,B} {xi}). By assumption starting both products
is ruled out as unproﬁtable, because two new products would have a negative eﬀect on the total
proﬁts, as discussed before. This is a shortcut to avoid a full ﬂedged investment in scope in the
model. Since being pioneer in either A or B is mathematically equivalent in our setting, we will
put them together in a single choice i. The value functions for being pioneer in a product and
waiting are:
V large iP ioneer = −F q¯ + βEmax
{
0,
[
xi − c] q¯} (3)
V largeWait = βEmax
{
0,max
{−F q¯ + β [xA − c] q¯,−F q¯ + β [xB − c] q¯}} (4)
Note that the value of pioneering in Eq. 3 is simply proportional to the one for narrow-scope ﬁrms
in Eq. 1. In contrast, the value of waiting for the wide-scope ﬁrm has one extra argument in the
maximization (Eq 2 and 4). This captures the idea that the large ﬁrm cares about the best project
between A and B. This is the key moving part of our model. Note that even if the exogenous
sunk cost F per unit of capacity is the same for large and small ﬁrms, the large ﬁrm has an extra
(endogenous) sunk cost, which emerges from its larger potential scope
9
2.3 Equilibrium characterization and predictions
In the Appendix we solve this model, showing that under some conditions strategic waiting is a
dominant strategy for large ﬁrms, but not for the small ones. Interestingly, as we will see below,
this strategic waiting by larger ﬁrms is an equilibrium when ﬁrms have high patience and when
the exogenous ﬁxed cost is not very large as a proportion of unit revenues. We believe this is a
sensible parameter space for our problem, since sending an export manager to close a small deal
with an importer overseas is unlikely to have large direct costs. Our option value framework adds
an additional sunk cost to large ﬁrms, emerging from the problem of selecting a new activity.14
Numerically solving the inequalities for the parameter space, yields three diﬀerent regions, depicted
in Figure 2. In the black region Ω1, with low values of both β and F , ﬁrms are very impatient.
Thus, even if the large ﬁrm can allocate its eﬀort in the best product by waiting, the gain does not
compensate the oportunity cost of time. As a result both the large and the small ﬁrm will pioneer
the product. On the other extreme we have the white region Ω3, where ﬁrms may enter or not,
following some potentially complex strategies and with few a priori ways to select an equilibrium,
as usual in coordination problems. We do not focus on this region because we have nothing new to
oﬀer in terms of how a given equilibrium is selected. In contrast, we focus on the gray region Ω2,
in which V large ipioneer < V
large
wait , so that it is optimal for the narrow scope ﬁrm to enter as pioneer and
for the wide ﬁrm to wait. Interestingly, this equilibrium turns out to be in the region with enough
patience β and limited sunk costs F , which we believe is qualitatively appropriate for exporting
of a good that ﬁrms already produce. We formalize this results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (Existence and uniqueness). With enough patience and low exogenous sunk costs,
such that {F, β} ∈ Ω2, there is a unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure
strategies such that:
(i) the small (narrow scope) ﬁrm enters as pioneer , while
(ii) the large (wide-scope) ﬁrm waits. Moreover, the large ﬁrm will only follow the best project out
of those started by small ﬁrms , if and only if for the best project x¯ > θ ≡ F
β
+ c .
Proof: See Appendix
[Figure 2 about here]
Following Proposition 1 we can deﬁne the two main predictions of the model that we will bring to
the data. The ﬁrst is that larger followers would enter only if they observe that x¯ > θ ≡ F
β
+ c.
This follower-entry cutoﬀ θ is of course larger than the cutoﬀ c for continuation of the pioneer.
14This is similar to the bandit allocation problems. The key diﬀerence, however, is that in our model learning
does not comes from pure waiting, but from waiting coupled with the other ﬁrm's decision to pioneer the product.
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Since the pioneer has already paid the sunk cost F per unit of exogenous capacity , the only thing
that matters for continuation is whether variable proﬁts are positive: xi > c. Even though the
follower does not always want to enter, because maybe c ≤ xi ≤ θ, there is on average a higher
likelihood that it will enter compared to the case when there is no survival by the small ﬁrm15,
since this would mean that xi < c. This gives us our ﬁrst ﬁrst testable predictions (for a more
formal derivation see appendix).
Prediction 1. The entry of followers is positively related to the survival of pioneers in the product.
Proof : See Appendix
Our second prediction follows from assuming that the exports we observe correspond to the gray
area in Figure 2 , which we endogenously deﬁne as{F, β} ∈ Ω2. In that region patience β is large
enough and the exogenous sunk cost F is low enough, so V largeWait > V
large
pioneer. This makes the large
ﬁrm prefer to delay, while the small ﬁrm enters as pioneer; which is equivalent to the following
statement.16.
Prediction 2 (First mover disadvantage). Everything else constant, export quantities and
revuenues in a product are larger for followers than for pioneers. Proof : See Appendix
It is important to remark that the strategic delay comes chieﬂy from free riding: the large ﬁrm
knows that there is another more focused ﬁrm exploring that will enter as a dominant strategy.
It is not suﬃcient to have more alternatives from which to choose in order to deliver the equilib-
rium of Proposition 1. The larger ﬁrms beneﬁts by waiting because information about xi will be
revealed, allowing the ﬁrm to choose the best project. In other words, the generation of a valuable
informational externality is what generates waiting. In fact, the absence of other small ﬁrm in a
sector stops free riding by the large ﬁrm. This would be the case if, for example, the large ﬁrm
knows in advance that it will be the only producer in the country, at least in the medium term.
This seems a likely scenario when ﬁrms have a large ﬁrst mover advantage, like in large scale
projects that take over the whole local market and prevent other players from exporting.
To ﬁnish it is important to remark some distinctive properties of our model. First is that the
proposed mechanism works even with no (exogenous) disproportional sunk cost for the pioneer
ﬁrm, no matter which ﬁrm is it, because we assumed F is constant across ﬁrms. This is diﬀerent
from models, like Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), which assume the pioneer pays an additional cost
of experimentation. Second is to clarify the source of the externality. Under some parameters
values a social planner would also want the more focused ﬁrm to be pioneer, both because it is
cheaper for society to spend Fq rather than F q¯, and because the focused ﬁrm has fewer real options
of waiting. In comparison with the competitive equilibrium of Proposition 1, the diﬀerence is that
the social planner would let the pioneer enter in a range of cases in which the pioneer would not
15It is interesting to note that in the region of parameters deﬁned in Figure 1 there is no region in the equilibrium
for which the wide scope enters and the narrow scope does not.
16The Appendix oﬀers a generalization of these predictions for the case where the wide scope ﬁrm has more than
two new projects from which to choose.
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be privately willing to enter. In terms of Figure 2 the social planner would like the gray area, to
be more extended towards the right. The more potential entrants, the wider the area to the right
in which the pioneer will be willing to enter if it can internalize the social beneﬁt to potential
followers.17
With this simple framework at hand, will are now better equipped to to look at the data.
3 Our data on new exporters
This section described our data sources as well as our procedure for constructing a database of new
products. Later on, it also describes the data both quantitatively and with a few speciﬁc examples
of products
3.1 Data construction
To understand pioneer-follower externalities in new exports we needed to build a dataset: (i)
at ﬁrm-product level, so we can distinguish ﬁrm behavior from industry behavior; (ii) in new
products/processes, where there is both something new to learn and it is possible to identify the
sequence of entry; and (iii) on the widest possible universe of products, to avoid hindsight biases in
ex post successful sectors. We are not aware of any other study of externalities within producers
of a product that uses a dataset with all these three characteristics
We built our dataset of new exporters based mostly on the Chilean database of export transactions
in all sectors. In total, Customs recorded more than 10 million transactions between 1990 and
2007. Relying on Customs data allows us to observe the development of new export industries that
are outside of the coverage of manufacturing censuses, which are a more traditional source of data
for ﬁrm level empirical trade papers. In particular, since diversiﬁcation in agriculture and mining
are important for developing countries, we believe our database can be useful for understanding
export entrepreneurship in less developed countries, compared to just using industrial level data18.
For all ﬁrms, we observe the product exported (in 6 digit Harmonized System classiﬁcation), the
year of the export, the destination and the export value is US dollars. Moreover, for the majority
of products we have the unit price and the quantity in the unit of export. Having revenues at
a product level is not very common in the literature on innovation, especially for economywide
studies. For example, the literature on patents normally does not have the price that each ﬁrm
gets for selling patented products or processes.
17The derivation of the social planner's problem is available in the web appendix.
18Also, many industrial surveys only consider ﬁrms of a minimum size. In the Chilean case, ﬁrms with less than
10 workers are not surveyed.
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To construct these ﬁlters we required additional sources of data: First some very basic tax ﬁrm
level records from the Internal Revenue Service. These include the economic sector(s) of the
ﬁrm according to a code analogous to the ISIC classiﬁcation. This information was crucial to
discriminate between ﬁrms that are actually producers of the exported good and ﬁrms that only
traders according to the Chilean IRS. IRS data was also important to disentangle the end of an
exporting spell on the one hand, and the death of the ﬁrm, on the other 19. This is relevant
because some ﬁrms may still be selling in the local market even if they are not exporting. Second
we ﬁltered out small transactions and reexports 20. The details of this ﬁltering process can be
found in the Appendix . Similarly, we wanted to avoid misidentifying a recoding of a product
as a new product. In our sample there were 3 major code re-classiﬁcations (HS-1992, HS-1996
and HS-2002), which we needed to homologate21. We built a correspondence across these three
diﬀerent vintages following the same theoretical principles of Pierce and Schott (2009)22.
We want to note that in probably most cases we are not analyzing products that have been invented
in Chile. These are products invented somewhere else, so we can more focus solely on the issue
of exporting rather than on more complex R&D processes. This would not be the case for an
advanced economy, like the Unites States, where our method might not be advisable to study
externalities in exports.
3.2 Deﬁning new and old products, pioneers and followers
After applying all the ﬁlters23, we ﬁrst divide our data productwise in two groups: new products
and existing or old products (the two columns of Table 1) We deﬁne an old product as any HS6
code that was exported during 1990-1994 by a ﬁrm for at least $10,000 during a year24. Our
analysis of new product thus begins in 1995, and a product is deﬁned as new when it has not been
exported in 1990-94 and it is exported between 1995-2006 by at least one ﬁrm with a minimum of
$10,000.25
19By having the dates when the ﬁrms stops operating.
20For this we merged our data with an available ﬁrm level panel from customs on all imports for the period
1990-2006.
21The change in coding as a problem to identify new products has been remarked by Kehoe and Ruhl (2009),
although in a diﬀerent context. They look at the huge jump in births of new SITC 4 digit products in various
countries during the years 1988 and 1989, which where precisely the years when customs around the world moved
their classiﬁcation to the Harmonized System.
22Appendix 9 explains the details of the transformation.
23For a detailed deﬁnition and analysis of the ﬁlters, please see the Appendix.
24We call these products old, in the sense that there is some amount of experience in the country about how and
where to export it
25Given that we wanted to create a ﬁve year pre-sample window, the period 1990-1994 was probably the earliest
we could take, because exactly before that period - around 1988 and 1989 - is the time when customs around the
world started to use the Harmonized System. As reported by Kehoe and Ruhl (2009), going beyond this date would
create many new products that emerge only for a year due to the new classiﬁcation. On the other hand, we
believe the 5 year window is appropriate because if we look at the delay between the entrance of the pioneer and
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Second, we classify ﬁrms, according to the sequence of entry in a product, as pioneers or followers.
For a new product , we deﬁne a pioneer as a ﬁrm that starts exporting the product in the ﬁrst
year26. A follower is a ﬁrm that began exporting the product at least one year after the pioneer did.
For the case of old products we do not deﬁne a pioneer, because it is (highly) possible that the
product was ﬁrst exported before our presample period of 1990-94, so we are unable to distinguish
which ﬁrm was the ﬁrst to export the product. For example, there are many cases where we have
certainty that these products started before 1990, and some of them well before 1900, like nitrates
or wines. For old products we also deﬁne a follower, mostly for benchmarking purposes. These
followers of an old product are ﬁrms that began exporting an old product after 1994. This means
that the product, although being old for the country is still new for the ﬁrm.
Table 1 shows a summary of the taxonomy we deﬁned. The columns refer to products; the left
column showing old products and the right column showing new products. The rows refer to ﬁrms,
which depending on the sequence of entry: pioneer (ﬁrst row) or follower (second row), depending
on whether the ﬁrm is the ﬁrst exporter from the country of that particular product or not.
Table 1 also shows the number of ﬁrms in each category. Interestingly, most of the ﬁrms-product
pairs start exporting something new for the ﬁrm but old for the country. (N = 10, 294 ; or 95.8%
of the observations). This makes clear that, in the study of the early stages of new exports, we
are working with a small fraction of the overall export structure of a country.
[Table 1 about here]
3.3 Patterns of entry
After concording HS 6-digit products codes for the period 1990-2006, we ﬁnd that out of 4632
possible product-codes in the classiﬁcation Chile already exported 2571 products during our pre-
sample period 1990-1994. We will classify these as old products. Our preferred ﬁlter allows
us to identify 295 new products exported during 1995-2006, but not during our ﬁve year pre-
sample period. Thus, during our sample period of twelve years the country explored 14% of the
theoretical potential of products that were not exported before 27 The total value exported of these
the follower, we see that in more than 70% of the cases the ﬁrst pioneer appears before ﬁve years of pioneer's entry
into exporting.
26There could be more than one pioneer in the ﬁrst year of a product. However, as we will see later, in most cases
have a single pioneer. Although we do have the exact date of entry, we prefer to keep the year as our minimum
unit of analysis
2714%. The fact that Chile during a decade exported around 10% of the theoretical products that were not yet
exported before is in itself a symptom that our method is relevant, because the country is far from hitting the
theoretical boundary of the number of products oﬀered by the HS classiﬁcation. In large developed economies, like
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new products steadily increased from US$1.5 million in 1995 ($46,000 per product) to $353 million
in 2006 ($4.3 million per product)28. This latter value represents a modest 1.1% of non-copper
exports from Chile.
[Table 2 about here]
A total of 345 ﬁrms participate in new export products 29. The total number of unique product-
ﬁrm observations is 444, indicating that on average only a few ﬁrms participate in each product.
However this average hides an interesting heterogeneity across products. Table 2 analyzes this
heterogeneity at the product level decomposing the products according to their number of pioneers
and follower ﬁrms. For the period 1995-2005, it shows that less than 30% of products have
followers. Second, only one third of the products with followers have two or more followers.30 This
quantitatively suggests that only few potential entrants into exporting can beneﬁt from learning,
which contrasts with the largely publicized cases of new product adoption in agriculture, where by
the structure of industry there are many potential entrants31. Second, in 96% of the new products
there is a single pioneer. This prima facie discards the idea that there were many ﬁrms waiting for
a single bilateral exchange rate change or trade restriction to improve in order to suddenly jump
into exporting, which was the focus of Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) with Mexican manufacturing
after NAFTA32.
Both results above, the low fraction of products with followers and the prevalence of products with
single pioneers, are robust to modiﬁcations to the deﬁnitions of new products and to considering
only early cohorts of products before 2000 33. For our purposes to understand externalities, the
the United States, we do not expect this to be the case, except for a couple for products directly based on natural
resources not produced in the US. Our method, we believe, is more suitable to measure innovative activity in small
open developing economies.
28The increase is clearly overwhelmingly due to the survival of new products which were introduced before 2006,
and which have signiﬁcantly increased their values since the year of their introduction into export markets)
29250 ﬁrms are pioneers and only 127 ﬁrms are followers. See analysis on table 2.
30That is, for each random pioneer in our sample, 17% have one follower and 11% have a little herd of at least
two followers
31Like the traditional case of Griliches (1957), and more recently Conley and Udry, 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig,
2010
32Additionally, three reasons might explain part of the diﬀerence between their study and ours. First, their study
calls new export product to anything that was not exported one year before their sample. In contrast, our study
takes ﬁve years to get closer to eﬀective new products. Second, we include all sectors, not only manufacturing.
Finally, Iacovone and Javorcik (2010) focus on a very large experiment of trade integration, as the NAFTA. Our
sample period lacks these extreme events of integration.
33Since one may be worried that our sample could be contaminated by small transactions that never intended to
be sustainable exports (like a Tobacco company re exporting a special machine it bought from another ﬁrm), we
run the same analysis restricting the sample to products where the pioneer lasted at least two consecutive years
exporting it. This ﬁlter takes away the above mentioned noise, but also many true pioneer failures. However, the
previously described pattern remains unaltered for most practical purposes (although, unsurprisingly, the sample
of new products decreased from 270 to 121). Reducing the cutoﬀ for exports to a minimum of $ 1,000 does not
greatly changes the above percentages (although with a higher number of products: 524). Panel B of Table 2 shows
that the same ﬁgure holds for the cohorts before 2000, indicating a robust relationship that is not an artifact of the
little remaining sample time that later cohorts have available for the birth of some followers.
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results of Table 2 indicate that having followers is infrequent and, when it happens, it tends to
be in limited numbers. However, it also shows that not all ﬁrms enter immediately, making it
plausible to think that in the few cases with followers, these learn something from the pioneer.
3.4 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 shows the characteristics of the export spells for each ﬁrm that we will be analyzing. The
ﬁrst thing to notice is that ﬁrms that export new goods are much larger exporters than the ﬁrms
that enter only into an old product. As expected in multi-product models of exports in the steady
state, like Mayer, Melitz, and Ottaviano (2010), the diﬀerence is concentrated in the exports of
existing goods (i.e excluding the pioneered product). While the mean log10 exports of other goods
for new ﬁrms is 4.54, the value for old exporters is 3.91, almost half an order of magnitude and
statistically signiﬁcant. Second, and reﬂecting something similar, exporters of new goods for the
country also are more likely to be large taxpayers, according to the Chilean IRS. This tends to rule
out the idea that the average exporter of new products might be a small ﬁrm. We will show later
that pioneers in new products tend to be smaller than followers in these same new products. But
overall, the exporters of new products are larger than those which simply export old products.
Interestingly though, the probability of lasting more than one season with the export experiment
does not signiﬁcantly diﬀer between followers of new products and followers of old products, both
are around 35%. If we take a weighted average for pioneers, taking into account those with followers
and those without followers, we also get a surprisingly similar 34%.
After this general comparison we focus on the macro diﬀerences between pioneers with followers,
and their followers. This is more meaningful since they deal with the same set of products. Here
one can remark that followers export larger amounts, which is something we will be testing more
formally in subsection 4.2. Importantly, the ﬁrms entering as followers seem more diversiﬁed in
terms of their economic activities. According to the Chilean IRS, followers have 0.7 more ISIC
codes per ﬁrm than the pioneers of the same products (2.66 versus 1.90, respectively). These
two facts are consistent with our model, which predict that more diversiﬁed ﬁrms would enter
as followers. Notably, some of these trends are visible even without controlling by product or
destination characteristics. Before testing the implications more formally, however, we will brieﬂy
review some case studies to remark qualitatively our results
[Table 3 about here ]
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3.5 A few canonical case studies.
An illustrative preview of our argument can be found in Figure 3 , which shows examples of
products according to the success34 of at least one ﬁrm in the product and the number of entrants
(only one entrant or more than one). Each quadrant contains the frequency of ﬁrms in each group
as well as a graph with a canonical example of a product in that category. In each graph the
horizontal axis shows the year and the vertical the (log10) exports of each ﬁrm in the product
in a given year, connected by a line for the same ﬁrm; so diﬀerent lines correspond to diﬀerent
ﬁrms. As a preview, the theories that focus on externalities from pioneer to follower (like Hoﬀ,
1997; or Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003) would focus mostly on case (C), of pioneers with followers.
In contrast, the family of models in which winner takes all the domestic market (extreme ﬁrst
mover advantage) would generate cases like those in panel (B).
[Figure 3 about here]
We ﬁrst focus on the failed experiments of Panel A, which is by far the most frequent case.
Depending on the ﬁlter we use, this groups represents between 85 and 90% of the products, where
no ﬁrm manages to survive sustainably35. The case shown is Zeolite, a mineral adsorbent , pioneered
by two ﬁrms in the same year, but after after an experiment both discontinued the endeavor.
We interviewed one of the ﬁrms, which was a multiproduct exporter of mineral fertilizers. In
the conversation the manager suggested that the lack of complementary inputs, namely proper
transportation and certiﬁcation, was responsible for the failure of this potentially sustainable
export experiment.
Second, we have products with a single surviving ﬁrm exporting, and no other followers. This
group of products with sustained but lonely pioneer tend to represent more than half the cases
when pioneers survive more than 5 seasons36. The example is Diphosphorus Pentaoxide, a chemical
(Panel B). A simple study of the industry makes clear why having it as a single exporter is not
surprising. Fosfoquim, founded in 1986, was not only the single producer of this chemical in
Chile, but also the only one in South America at the time. In a context of high economies of scale,
it is hard to argue that the pioneer was expecting some followers. Thus, one can expect that in
these cases there is no gap between the social and the private incentives to experiment in exporting
this product. 37
Finally, in Panel C we depict a canonical case of successful pioneer with followers: standard home
Refrigerators. In this product two well experienced ﬁrms survived to the trade liberalization period
34We deﬁne success in a product if a ﬁrm survived ﬁve or more consecutive years exporting the product. In this
deﬁnition we obviously exclude products that began being exported after 2001. Otherwise we would not have time
to even have a single ﬁrm nsurviving more than ﬁve years, since the sample ends in 2006
35By sustainably we mean more than 5 years, even controlling by cohort eﬀects
36see Table 4
37An analogous case might be the well known case of aircrafts in the United States (Boeing) or Europe (Airbus)
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in the 1970s and 1980s, and starte to export refrigerators during the mid 1990s. Interestingly, the
year that the pioneer started to export refrigerators, both ﬁrms were exporters of some other
product, which is a general trend in our data38. This tells us that ﬁrms might be learning about
exporting this product, rather than a general learning about exporting. A second remark is that
the pioneer ﬁrm in refrigerators is systematically smaller and less diversiﬁed than the follower.
This is precisely consistent with our model and we will show, in Section 4, that this trend holds
for our sample of new products 39
The case of refrigerators, unlike the one for Phosphate, suggests the possibility of an externality.
Nonetheless, refrigerators are still a product with few potential entrants into exporting, because
there are few ﬁrms in the country, and it is unlikely that the structure of the industry would change
so much after starting to export. Successful pioneers receive more followers in, for example, the
meat packing industry, where there are more players. For example, Figure 4 shows ﬁve ﬁrms
following the pioneer exporter of frozen beef tongue, which in 2006 had around 3 million dollars in
exports from Chile, mostly to Japan.40
[Figure 4 about here]
Taking stock, the descriptive statistics and narratives we outline above indicate some characteristics
that anecdotally ﬁt with our model. First is the massive risk of a failed experiment, that justify
learning. Second is that sectors with followers show a distinctive pattern, in which pioneers tend
to export less (ex post) and and are less diversiﬁed that followers. Finally, in some sectors it is
harder to argue that there is learning within the same product, since there are no followers.
In the next section we make a more systematic test of the diﬀerent hypotheses.
4 Testing predictions
38Almost none of the ﬁrms in our sample start exporting all new products in the same year
39These are the cases of single index models, similars in the mechanism to Hopenhayn (1992) or Melitz (2003)
40Exports of this product began in 1999 by Nippon Meat Packers , which was already an important exporter of
frozen pork meat. Until 2002 it was the only exporter of Bovine tongues, frozen from Chile. This was a company
with little expertise in bovine production, but a lot of expertise on frozen meats and in the Asian market. Despite
having no clear advantage in the production it was the pioneer. After four years of lonely pioneering, in 2003
Frigoriﬁcos Lo Valledor started to export, with a ﬁrst year's shipment more than 30% larger than the one used by
the Pioneer in its ﬁrst year . In 2004 many other ﬁrms entered (Frigoriﬁco de Osorno ; Carnes Nuble ; Procesadora
Insuban). Interestingly, the followers are overwhelmingly mature ﬁrms in the bovine processing industry, which of
course did produce beef tongue, but did not freeze or export them to the a market where it was more valuable. Four
years after having followers, the pioneer was eventually surpassed. Not surprisingly, the new leader in sales was the
largest meat packer of the country. We do not interpret this surpassing as if it were a closed oligopolistic market
(as usual in the Industrial Organization or Business Strategy literature) because many other countries export beef
tongue to Japan (Chile represents less than 5% of Japanese imports in this product). Overall, it seems that the
pioneer had a comparative advantage in exploring rather than at exporting this particular product.
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4.1 Surviving pioneers get more followers.
A potential follower can update its priors about product proﬁtability given the failure of the
pioneer 41 Interestingly, both learning from successful and avoiding the loser products predict a
positive correlation between the survival of pioneer and entry into the product. This is exactly our
Prediction 1, for which we ﬁnd clear support in Table 4. According to Panel B when the pioneer
quits in the ﬁrst season, then only in 26% of the products there is a follower. In contrast, when
the pioneer survives the ﬁrst season, there is more than 40% chance of having followers (p-value of
χ2test : 0.018). These results are robust when we control for cohort eﬀects, as shown in Table 542 .
In products where the pioneer survives for more than one or two seasons, it is 12 percentage points
more likely to ﬁnd followers entering the product (Speciﬁcations 1 and 2). Thus, we get overall
support for Prediction 1, that pioneer survival is positively related to follower entry. Section 5.1
uses price information and placebo tests to reduce concerns about an alternative interpretetation
of this result, in which followers may not learn from pioneers, but simply have a diﬀerent entry
threshold.
[Table 4 about here]
[Table 5 about here]
Finding that survival of pioneers is positively related to entry is neither trivial nor obvious. In
our sample there are products with extreme ﬁrst mover advantage, like the Phosphate exporter
discussed in section 3. In these cases the survival of pioneers would arguably discourage entry
of other ﬁrms, since the pioneer takes over the domestic market and exports an excedent. In
particular, models with increasing returns to scale at a ﬁrm level, like a simple monopolistic
competition demand with a ﬁrm setup cost, would predict either a zero or a negative correlation
between success of the pioneer and entry. In these models a follower may want to enter in the
same product only if the pioneer exits.
To explore why some products have followers and others do not, we run additional tests in Table 5.
In speciﬁcations (3) and (4) we observe that surviving at least 5 seasons, does not make a statistical
diﬀerence for entry, at least not across the board43. However, a large duration of the pioneers
seems to have an heterogeneous eﬀect on the entry of followers. In particular, on those goods
that CEPII (2010) classiﬁes as Consumption goods, having a successful and longlasting pioneer
41See for example Segura-Cayuela and Vilarrubia (2008)
42This robustness check is important because there could something particular about a given entry year. For
example, products that are started to be exported later have mechanically less time to have followers. Similarly,
a particular year can have systematically more or less products being born, for example because of exchange rate
changes as in the case with the neighboring Argentina in 2002
43Here we needed to restrict our sample to products started until 2000, to have enough time to evaluate whether
the pioneer lasted 5 years of not and whether it has followers
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seems to induce entry by large and signiﬁcant 68 percentage points (F-stat= 26)44. Checking
anecdotes case by case, we observe that these Consumption goods tend to have more domestic
ﬁrms operating, and thus have a large number of potential entrant into exporting, which is an
indication that many followers can potentially beneﬁt from ﬁnding a good export product close
to that industry. For Intermediates (non-Consumption goods), the large duration of a pioneer
has a negative point estimate for the eﬀect on duration, although it is not statistically signiﬁcant.
In the context of our model, we think of Consumer goods as a proxy for potential entrants
into exporting. A diﬀerent proxy we use is an index of the scale of some industries used by
Antràs (2003), which corresponds to the average turnover of an establishment in the US (see Data
subsection). In speciﬁcation (6) a 1% larger scale implies a decrease in 0.05 percentage points in
the probability of having followers. We feel that all these proxies are imperfect, but seem consistent
with the idea that industries supporting a larger number of ﬁrms can support post-pioneer entry
into exporting. In short, on our aggregate sample we do ﬁnd strong support for prediction 1, that
survival of the pioneer induces entry. However, we recognize that pioneer-takes-all models do have
empirical byte in some sectors, because in more than half of the cases of longlasting45 pioneers
we do not observe followers.
4.2 Pioneers export less than followers.
To test that there are externalities, we not only need to know that survival of pioneers is associated
with entry. In fact, maybe both the pioneer and the follower can just be observing a public signal
(like the international price of a commodity, available in the newspapers). In these cases one
ﬁrm may react faster than the other, but there is no true learning. Under these circumstances,
the standard model in which ﬁrms diﬀer only in productivity would predict the largest ex-post
exporter would be, on average, the ﬁrst ﬁrm willing to pay a sunk cost of exporting46. In this
subsection we ﬁnd exactly the opposite , that pioneers tend to be smaller, which is consistent with
prediction 2 of our model.
4.2.1 Pioneers are smaller at entry
Many papers note that ﬁrms tend to enter small and then grow in volume (Ruhl and Willis, 2009;
Rauch and Watson, 2003; Albornoz, Corcos, Ornelas, and Pardo, 2010; Arkolakis, 2009). Here
we not only ﬁnd this positive slope within ﬁrm, conditional on survival, but we get an additional
result that would not be available if we omit - as previous papers do - the sequence of entry into
44This value is obtained by adding the coeﬃcients of the interaction [Duration pioneer≥ 5∗Consumption Good]
and that of [Duration pioneer≥ 5] in speciﬁcation (6). We obtain a similar result in speciﬁcation (5).
45Meaning that the export spell lasted at least ﬁve seasons, as in Table 4 Panel B
46Freund and Pierola (2009) have a model with these characteristics
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exporting a product. Table 6 shows that after taking into account product ﬁxed eﬀects, pioneers
enter with approximately 40% less quantity (p-value<0.1) and have 20% fewer ISIC activity codes
(p-value<0.05) than followers. In contrast, we cannot distinguish that pioneers enter with diﬀerent
prices. A diﬀerent way to show the same phenomenon is Table 7, where pioneers are 30% less likely
to have the largest exported value in the product at entry. This result is qualitatively robust to
the inclusion of diﬀerent time controls (Speciﬁcations 1 to 447). When we restrict the sample only
to those products that got a follower at most three years after the pioneer (speciﬁcation 6)48 the
coeﬃcient for pioneers is more negative than in other speciﬁcations, showing that early followers
are almost 50% more likely to be the largest ﬁrm in comparison to pioneers. 49
[Table 6 about here]
[Table 7 about here]
In short, conditional on entry, followers tend to start exporting the product in larger volumes.
Although it is not the only possibility, this pattern is consistent with learning by the follower
from the pioneer about for example shipment size, demand or perceived risk at entry. It can be
also that followers tend to be larger exporters in general, which is what we ﬁnd in Figure 5, and
what Prediction 2 would predict. In Figure 5, we observe that the distribution of exports in other
products is shifted to the right, in comparison to pioneers50, a fact that is statistically signiﬁcant at
95% conﬁdence according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Although we do not observe domestic
sales, this test is reassuring as a way to show that pioneers tend to be smaller than followers. The
non parametric kernel density of Figure 5 (Panel C) also shows that pioneer entrants have fewer
economic activity codes than followers, which ﬁts overall with our assumption in the model.
[Figure 5 about here]
4.2.2 Pioneers are also smaller, on average, after entry
One could argue that the advantage for followers was only about the size at entry, but not in
subsequent periods, like in models where ﬁrms start smaller only in the experimentation phase
47Results do not change qualitatively if we introduce a time trend (speciﬁcation 2) for the entry year, year of entry
ﬁxed eﬀects (speciﬁcation 3) or time of entry trend and a dummy for ﬁrms that survive until 2006 (speciﬁcation 4).
48Its hard to argue that there might be learning from the pioneer if the follower starts a decade after the entry of
the pioneer, at least the type of learning that we are describing, which seems to be more related to internationalizing
your products rather than production itself. For this reason our speciﬁcations we restrict the entry of followers to a
certain number years after the entry of the pioneer, speciﬁcation 5 being the one that allows the largest lag between
pioneer and follower.Even in that speciﬁcation the eﬀect can be observed.
49The results are in nominal US Dollars. Using real local currency (Chilean Pesos corrected by inﬂation) just
magniﬁes the eﬀect
50To be clear, this includes all exports in the year of entry, but without counting the volume in the new product
they just entered. Note also that this is comparing ﬁrms in the same set of new products (i.e. pioneer with followers
and their followers)
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(see Rauch and Watson, 2003). However, we also ﬁnd that an average early follower exports
more than the pioneer when we compare them in subsequent years when they both export strictly
positive quantities51
Table 10 shows regressions of post entry quantities after correcting by product-year ﬁxed eﬀects,
which means we are comparing pioneers and followers within a product and within the same year.
Regression (1), restricted to all observations post entry, shows a negative point estimates for the
pioneer dummy, though we cannot statistically reject the hypothesis that pioneers and followers
sell the same amounts when we do not condition on the experience the ﬁrm has in exporting the
product. However, we know that it takes some time to build a customer base, so incorporating
experience is an important factor, as argued by Arkolakis (2009). Indeed in speciﬁcation (2) we
restrict to a more mature phase of product penetration, in which ﬁrms have at least three seasons
exporting a product. Here our result clearly emerges: pioneers are smaller than followers by an
order of magnitude (0.1 ≈ exp {−2.4}), ﬁtting the example of refrigerators we observed in section
3.
[Table 10 about here]
[Table 9 about here]
Speciﬁcations 3 and 4 take a broader sample, but correct for experience in the product, ﬁnding
qualitatively similar results. Since we know that pioneers have by deﬁnition more experience than
a follower in a given year, it is useful to compare the coeﬃcient of the pioneer dummy with that
of an additional year of experience to get a sense of the magnitudes . Roughly speaking, to export
the equivalent of a ﬁrst year follower a pioneer requires three or four years of experience exporting
the product. (by dividing the coeﬃcient for pioneer, -3.2, by the coeﬃcient for year, 0.70, one gets
3.8 for the point estimate ) . We run speciﬁcations with a more ﬂexible pattern for experience in
regression (4), including quadratic terms and dummies, but we still ﬁnd that the pioneer sells less
quantity. In contrast to the diﬀerences in quantities, we cannot distinguish any pioneer eﬀect
on prices, as shown in the diﬀerent speciﬁcations of Table 9. As a result, the total trade volume
diﬀerences between pioneers and followers (Table 10) display the same pattern as the quantity
data. The disadvantage is explained by quantities rather than prices. 52
[Table 10 about here]
51This deals with the problem reported by Lieberman and Montgomery (1998), who show that by having a zero
share in some years one can falsely get a result where the ﬁrst mover has an advantage rather than a disadvantage.
52The sample with trade volume (price times quantity) is slightly larger than the sample with separate data on
prices and quantities. Our result of ﬁrst-mover disadvantage on total trade volume are not sensitive to which of the
two samples we use.
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[Figure 6 about here]
To make the ﬁrst mover disadvantage clearer, Figure 6 graphs the simulated sales implied by
regression (3), computing 95% conﬁdence intervals using the Delta method for a product that was
discovered seven years ago. This allows us to show how expected sales vary within a product as
the timing at entry changes. The horizontal indicates the normalized year of the product in which
they have entered. Thus, those at t = 0 are the pioneers of the product, while those at t = 1,2 ...
6 are followers entering one, two and up to six years after the pioneer. We observe that experience
and selection are important, because the earlier you enter, the more you sell. However, that is not
valid for the pioneers53, which have lower average export sales than early followers. As discussed
before, the point estimate of sales for pioneers is, with a 95% conﬁdence, consistently lower than
for early followers. The diﬀerence is only equivalent to the the revenues for ﬁrm entering in three
or fours years later. This persists, when controlling for all ﬁxed characteristics in a product-year
combination (e.g. taste shock, international demand shift, price of traded inputs, exchange rate...).
In any case, speciﬁcation 2 in Table 8 shows that after three years in a product, an average follower
is unconditionally larger, despite having less experience in a given year.
Finally, it is important to remark that this eﬀect of the pioneer being smaller survives even when
we focus on a speciﬁc destination with enough sample size. Speciﬁcation (5) of Table 8 replicates
speciﬁcation (2) , but restricting our attention to exporters to Argentina. Our results look very
similar and statistically signiﬁcant, despite having less than a quarter of the sample size.
Taking stock, our results conditional on multiple entrants indicate that the pioneer might not be
the ﬁrm that beneﬁts the most from the discovery of a new product. Interestingly, this is not only
counterfactual to what one would expect from extrapolating current trade models of the steady
state (i.e.Melitz, 2003), but it is also contrary to the assumption of Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2010) that pioneers have a roughly constant returns to scale technology. On average, pioneers in
our sample do not export the largest amounts in a product, followers do.
5 Alternative explanations that do not imply externalities
Our ﬁndings, even though they suggest a story consistent with externalities, could still be driven
by alternative explanations. Below we analyze three potential alternatives which do not consider
external economies and that could generate similar patterns in the data. For each case we provide
evidence that tends to undermine them as a potential challenge to our interpretation.
53The decreasing slope can be consequence of both experience accumulation as well as the the entry of smaller
ﬁrms as in the now standard Melitz (2003) selection eﬀect.
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5.1 Both pioneers and followers react to a publicly available signal
A positive time trend in the international price of a product, or in any other publicly available
signal of export proﬁtability, can make the smaller ﬁrms enter ﬁrst into a product, if one assumes
that these smaller pioneers have an (exogenously) lower sunk cost of exploration vis-a-vis the large
exporters. This story would be consistent with our stylized facts so far, but would not have any
learning ﬂowing from pioneers to followers. In this scenario the large ﬁrms would react later only
because they have a larger exogenous sunk cost, so they need a larger threshold proﬁtability to
enter into exporting this product, as in any standard dynamic investment problem. Here we show,
however, that other stylized facts render this scenario less likely. First, Table 6 shows that prices
received at entry into exporting are not statistically diﬀerent between pioneers and followers. Thus,
we cannot distinguish the upward trend in prices hypothesized by the alternative explanation. A
second counterargument comes from a falsiﬁcation exercise. If what really matters for entry is not
the survival of the pioneer, but simply a public signal, then entry into our new products would
be correlated with the survival of any ﬁrm , rather than being disproportionally correlated to the
survival of the pioneer. When we implement this test in Table 5 (speciﬁcation 3), the survival of
the pioneer keeps being statistically signiﬁcant, while the duration of a randomly chosen ﬁrm in the
product is not. This suggests that the survival of the pioneer is more informative to explain entry
. A ﬁnal counterargument is that many of our ﬁrms seems to be already producing the product for
the domestic market. This makes unlikely that the exogenous sunk costs vary disproportionally
across ﬁrms. At the end of the day, the direct costs are simply about sending an export manager
to a foreign market to close an export deal. In our view, diﬀerences in sunk cost do not come
from exogenous diﬀerences between small and large ﬁrms, but from the fact that large ﬁrms have
diﬃculties ﬁguring out what product to focus on. In conclusion, these three arguments reduce
concerns abour our results being driven by a public signal, available to anyone, rather than by
some external economies.
5.2 Product life cycle
Another possible alternative argument is that what we are seeing are not discovery externalities,
but simply diﬀerential mortality of ﬁrm-product lines, which are diﬀerent over the life cycle of the
product (early producers are better at R&D than at discovering large quantities in standardized
markets). However, our sample focuses on products that are new for the country; which is com-
pletely diﬀerent from starting products that are new to the world, as in the studies of Agarwal
and Gort (1996); Agarwal (1997) and Klepper (1996). According to Vernon (1966), less developed
countries start exporting a product once these are more advanced in the product life cycle, so
there is much less uncertainty about how to produce the good. Intuitively, frozen beef tongue or a
phosphate chemical are hardly new products in the world in the last 50 years. Beyond this anec-
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dotal argument, we again point out that we ﬁnd no statistical diﬀerence between the prices faced
by pioneers and followers when they entered into exporting (Table 6). If products were evolving
quickly during our time frame this statistically ﬂat price would be extremely unlikely.
5.3 Pioneer is being pushed away from the domestic market
One can argue that pioneers are smaller not because they decided to innovate, but because they
were pushed by larger domestic players into a low proﬁt export market. This would rationalize our
facts about smaller pioneers, but in a way that does not require an externality. We do not have data
on domestic prices and quantities, which are very unlikely to exist at the level of disaggregation we
are working with exports. Even if we had them, in multiproducts ﬁrms there is always the criticism
that one does not observe proﬁts of product lines. Despite this problem, we oﬀer some arguments
that can reduce our concerns about the scenario of pushed pioneers. A ﬁrst counterargument
is the positive covariance between the survival of pioneer and the entry of followers, discussed in
section 4.1. If a large ﬁrm chooses to delay its internationalization in the product because the
domestic rangeland was greener, it is hard to understand why it would decide to systematically
enter later on. It is even less likely if one thinks that the price received by exporters did not
statistically change between the time the pioneer and the follower decided to enter (Table 6). A
second counterargument is that, when ﬁrms are losing domestic market share, they may escape to
markets with lower quality requirements. To test this possibility, we replicated the procedure in
Table 8, but excluding exports to neighboring countries with lower GDP level than Chile (Bolivia
and Peru). We did not ﬁnd qualitative changes in our results, which reduces our priors about this
potential concern. 54
5.4 Reﬂection and identiﬁcation
One can ﬁnally argue that larger exporters may be exogenously and intrinsically slower to react,
rather than endogenously slower due to sunk cost (section 5.1). This ﬂexible ad-hoc hypothesis can
generate our stylized facts without any learning. In fact, this large-exporter-is-just-slow coun-
terargument is simply a statement of Manski's (1993) reﬂection problem, in which an endogenous
social eﬀect, like learning between ﬁrms, cannot be separately identiﬁed in the cross section from
pure ﬁrm characteristics that are collinear with the social eﬀect. We partially escape from this
reﬂection problem by using time-series variation within a product rather than just a cross-section.
To rule out further ad-hoc hypotheses we need an identiﬁcation assumption: that the ability to re-
54A third possibility to test the pushed pioneers would be to check whether mortality of pioneer ﬁrms is higher,
as one would expect if they are losing market share. We are currently working on this possibility using IRS data
on ﬁrm deaths.
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spond fast to signals does not systematically diﬀer between large and small exporters of a product.
For identiﬁcation we need the speed of reaction to be a choice. 55
55A ﬁnal alternative possibility we cannot fully tell apart in our paper is as follows. Immagine that the ﬁrst
export event is simply the result of an exogenous phone call received from a potential customer overseas, which
generates a pioneer event by a random ﬁrm in the country. After this ﬁrst export, however, all ﬁrms learn about
this new export possibility, but endogenously only the larger and most productive decide to enter, while the pioneer
remains exporting simply because of hysteresis. This can generate a systematic ﬁrst mover disadvantage, as we
ﬁnd in the data. The above story has indeed learning, which is what we wanted to explore since the title of our
paper. However, in this story the innovation is exogenous and eﬀortless, so there is no social waste and no role for
policy. Our view is that there is an eﬀort in discovering a new export product, which is indeed the theme of many
export promotion programs.
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6 Concluding remarks.
Using detailed customs transactions from Chile (1990-2006), our paper presents facts consistent
with pioneer-to-follower externalities in new export products. First, we ﬁnd that products with
surviving pioneers have more followers, which is consistent with either learning from the successes
or avoiding the failures of pioneers. Second, we ﬁnd that pioneers both enter and remain smaller
than followers, suggesting that the ﬁrst explorer may not be the same ﬁrm that beneﬁts the most
from the discovery.
We rationalize these facts in a simple model, in which larger ﬁrms have a wider set of potential
new projects to pursue. Since they cannot develop all of them, because of decreasing returns to
scope, their problem is to allocate an indivisible scarce resource to the best possible use. The
extra potential scope, vis-a-vis smaller and more focused ﬁrms, generates an incentive for larger
ﬁrms to strategically delay entry. In contrast, smaller exporters with fewer options tend to enter
sooner, giving information to followers. This mechanism, though simple, is novel and rich enough
to explain the potential for external economies: followers may free-ride on the pioneer's experiment.
Our goal in this paper was to update existing priors about the existence of pioneer-follower exter-
nalities in new exports from emerging markets. If the reader came from a more agnostic position,
our research oﬀers a set of facts that do not fully prove, but seriously suggest industry learning.
In contrast, if the reader has been previously exposed to the seductive successes of garments in
Bangladesh, ﬂowers in Kenya or Salmon in Chile; our paper becomes a cautionary note. Our non
selected sample of products shows for the ﬁrst time the very high risk of new exports, in which
more than 85% of new products do not survive beyond 5 seasons. This risk ought to be considered
by any serious export promotion program, as well as by any strategy of international entrepreneur-
ship. Even among these sustained exports not all products suggest externalities. Indeed, at least
half the products have lonely pioneers. If the pioneer is really successful and nobody is copying,
maybe the market oﬀers enough reward to internalize any learning that the pioneer is creating.
From a policy perspective, sectors where the pioneer has a natural ﬁrst-mover-advantage, like the
Phosphate case, may not be the most likely case of within product externalities.
We conclude with opportunities for further research. The ﬁrst is to learn more about how new
products start being produced, rather than exported. While for born global ﬁrms both production
and exporting happen at the same time, other ﬁrms are much more dependant on domestic demand
for their early growth. A second extension is to understand better what determines the exploration
of products for diﬀerent distances from the ﬁrm's current capabilities. Finally, it is important to
check whether our results can be replicated, or reversed, in other countries; as we are currently
doing with Colombian exporters.
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7 Figures
Figure 1. Diagram showing the extensive form of the game for each ﬁrm, depending on type.
F
β
0 0.05 0.15 0.20
0.5
0.6
0.8
0.9
1.0
{F, β} ∈ Ω3
{F, β} ∈ Ω2
small firm pioneers
and large firm waits
{F, β} ∈ Ω1
both firms pioneer
Figure 2. Equilibria depending on the values of patienceβ and exogenous sunk cost F . Region Ω1
in black has a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies in which both ﬁrms enter immediately as
pioneers. Region Ω2 , in grey, has the unique equilibrium of interest in this paper, in which being
pioneer is the dominant strategy for the small ﬁrm and waiting is the dominant strategy for the large
ﬁrm. Region Ω3 can potentially have multiple equilibrium, with the outcome depending on more
sophisticated equilibrium concepts. Values plotted at c = 0.1
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Figure 3. Graphs showing the export sales (in log10 US Dollars) of all ﬁrms exporting a given
product. Each ﬁrm is connected by a line of the same color. In addition, if one ﬁrm does not have a
scatter point in a given year it means that it did not export
Duration of the export spell
sustained failed experiment
N
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s
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1
(b) Successful but lonely pioneer: ( 5 to 10 % of products) (a) Failure: 80 to 90% of cases
N
f
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>
1
(c) Pioneer with follower catches up: ≤ 3-5% of cases
The pioneer can be distiguished because it corresponds to the line that starts closer to the left of each graph.
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Figure 4. A case with many potential entrants into exporting
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(a) Total Exports in other products at entry (log USD) (b) Number of destinations served by the ﬁrm (log)
(c) Firm scope: Number of ISIC activity codes
Figure 5. Empirical distribution (kernel density) of (a) the volume of other exports, (b) the number
of destinations served , (c) the scope of ﬁrms measured in terms of numbers of CIIU activities.
Logarithmic scale for (a) and (b). For all cases the distribution for followers has more mass to the
right of the distribution, with 5% signiﬁcance according to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distribution
equality. (p-value 0.045 for export volume, p-value 0.027 for destinations, p-value 0.004 for scope).
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Figure 6. Simulation of the regression coeﬃcients showing no ﬁrst mover advantage. Conﬁdence
intervals at 95%.
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8 Tables
Table 1. Taxonomy of diﬀerent events of a ﬁrm exporting a product
Has any ﬁrm exported this product from the country before 1995 ?
YES NO
old product new product
YES N/A Pioneernew product
N = 0 N = 136
Is it the ﬁrst ﬁrm exporting the
product from the country ?
NO Followerold product Followernew product
N = 10, 294 N = 308
Table 2. New export products for Chile, classiﬁed according to number of pioneers and followers.
Cohorts of products started by some ﬁrm in 1995-2005 (A) and 1995-2000 (B).
(A) Only product cohorts before Dec 31, 2005 (B) Only product cohorts before Dec 31, 2000
N of Pioneers N of Pioneers
1 2 3 Total % 1 2 Total %
N
followers
N
followers
0 185 5 1 70.7% 0 110 5 66%
1 43 4 0 17.4% 1 27 4 18%
2 19 0 0 7.0% 2 17 0 10%
3 6 1 0 2.6% 3 5 1 3%
4 to 6 6 0 0 2.1% 4 to 6 6 0 3%
Total % 95.9% 3.7% 0.4% 100%
N = 270∗
Total % 94% 6% 100%
N = 175∗∗
Cutoﬀ to deﬁne a new product is $10,000 minimum of exports in a given year by a ﬁrm. (*) The cohort of products
born in 2006 is excluded from the calculation in Panel A because there are no followers by deﬁnition. That reduces
the total sample from 295 products to 270. (**) As a robustness Panel (B) includes only the cohorts of products
strictly before 2001, to check that the pattern described before is robust across cohorts.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of product-ﬁrm pairs
Type of product-ﬁrm
pair in the sample
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Follower in new products mean 4.70 2.66 0.36 4.38 0.35 0.37
SE(mean) 0.05 0.19 0.04 0.24 0.04 0.04
median 4.52 2.00 0.00 5.30 0.00 0.00 136
Pioneer with follower mean 4.57 1.90 0.32 4.32 0.11 0.48
SE(mean) 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.30 0.03 0.05
median 4.34 1.00 0.00 5.32 0.00 0.00 84
Pioneer w/o followers mean 4.62 2.00 0.39 4.72 0.21 0.29
SE(mean) 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.03
median 4.43 2.00 0.00 5.60 0.00 0.00 224
Total New products mean 4.64 2.19 0.37 4.54 0.23 0.35
SE(mean) 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.02
median 4.45 2.00 0.00 5.46 0.00 0.00 444
Follower of old products mean 4.68 - 0.23 3.91 0.25 0.45
SE(mean) 0.01 - 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00
median 4.53 - 0.00 5.09 0.00 0.00 10294
Export values are in USD. The expression tpf = 0 refers to the year of entry of a ﬁrm into this new product that the ﬁrm
did not export before. Duration ≥ 1 season dummy indicates that the export spell for that ﬁrm in that product survived
more than one season exporting. Large Taxpayer is a classiﬁcation of the Chilean Internal Revenue Services. The number
of ISIC categories in which the ﬁrm participates is actually an adaptation of the ISIC system, with more granularity, used
by the Internal Revenue Service in Chile.
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Table 4. Percentage of products classiﬁed according to the survival of pioneers and entry of followers.
(A) Five year duration of pioneer (B) One year duration of pioneer
Product has follower(s) Product has follower(s)
No Yes Total No Yes Total
Pioneer
duration < 5
69.3 8.0 77.3
Pioneer
duration ≤ 1 44.4 15.9 60.3 %
Pioneer
duration ≥ 5 13.3 9.3 22.7
Pioneer
duration > 1
23.4 16.3 39.7
Total 82.7 17.3 100 % Total 67.8 32.2 100 %
N = 75∗ N = 239
Pr
(
Pearson's χ2(1) > 8.72
)
= 0.03 Pr
(
Pearson's χ2 ≥ 5.67) = 0.018
(*) Sample includes only products started by
someone until 2001, otherwise our deﬁnition of
success would be tautologically zero in later
cohorts. Also, the sample is restricted to products
having at least one follower lasting more than one
season. If the short term followers are included,
the diﬀerence is even larger against the null
hypothesis
(**) Observations only of products started until
2003, to give enough time to have followers.
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Table 5. Linear probability regressions of followers' entry on pioneer performance and product
characteristics
Dependent variable: 1 [Entry of followers > 0]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Duration pioneer ≥ 1 0.120** 0.481* 0.177** 0.156** 0.161**
(0.057) (0.263) (0.077) (0.0785) (0.0793)
Duration pioneer ≥ 2 0.111*
(0.065)
Duration pioneer≥ 5 -0.093 -0.086 -0.193 -0.196
(0.158) (0.151) (0.149) (0.153)
Consumption good 0.065 -0.019 -0.081
(0.109) (0.114) (0.122)
Duration pioneer ≥ 5 * Consumption good 0.773*** 0.876***
(0.180) (0.186)
log Scale of production -0.059*
(0.033)
Duration placebo pioneer ≥ 1 -0.316
(0.268)
Year when prod
started
FE FE FE FE year&
year2
year&
year2
Observations 295 295 175 174 174 166
R-squared 0.116 0.111 0.084 0.080 0.071 0.093
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The duration of pioneer variables correspond to the duration in years of the export spell of the pioneer in
that product. The duration beyond ﬁve years accepts at most one year of interrupted exports within a
spell. Consumption good is a dummy for CEPII's classiﬁcation of HS6 codes as consumer, as opposed to
diﬀeernt categories of intermediate goods (See Data). Log scale of production is a product characteristic
that corresponds to the average establishment sales of the industries producing these products in the US
(see Data). Sample sizes in speciﬁcations (3) to (6) are smaller because the sample is restricted to
products started until 2000, so it is possible to observe a pioneer for at least ﬁve years and have followers.
Regression (6) has 8 fewer observations because not all sectors NAICS sectors can be matched to the HS6
codes to merge the variable Scale of production. Duration placebo pioneer is the duration of a
randomly chosen ﬁrm in the product. In the cases of products with a single ﬁrm, it coincides with the
true pioneer, but in products with followers it does not necessarily coincide. All the regressions have a
constant and year coeﬃcients, not reported because of space constraints.
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Table 6. Regressions of diﬀerential behavior of pioneers at entry
HS 6 Commodity under study ay entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES ln
(N
co
d
es
+
1)
ln
(P
Q
ot
h
er
p
ro
d
)
ln
(P
Q
)
ln
(P
)
ln
(Q
)
1*
[D
u
ra
ti
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≥
2
]
1 ∗ [pioneer] -0.230** 0.192 -0.172 0.178 -0.458* 0.072
(0.116) (0.781) (0.151) (0.243) (0.252) (0.096)
Constant 0.824*** 9.962*** 10.60*** 2.968*** 7.913*** 0.313***
(0.0654) (0.478) (0.0825) (0.151) (0.160) (0.0642)
Product FE FE FE FE FE FE
N 192 220 220 180 180 154
R2 0.411 0.548 0.501 0.912 0.906 0.499
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7. Linear Probability Regressions on a dummy for being the largest exporter in the product
at entry . Every observation is a single ﬁrm in a product, demeaned by the product ﬁxed eﬀects.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
entry within 5 years after the pioneer entry
within 10
years
entry
within 3
years
1 [Pioneer in product] -0.229** -0.377** -0.490*** -0.367** -0.307*** -0.472*
(0.0946) (0.174) (0.180) (0.177) (0.116) (0.270)
year of entry -0.0560 FE -0.0559 -0.0426** -0.106
(0.0552) (0.0559) (0.0203) (0.132)
1 ∗ [Lasts until end of sample] 0.0956
(0.143)
Constant 0.452*** 112.5 1.512*** 112.4 85.75** 211.8
(0.0632) (110.5) (0.494) (111.8) (40.59) (263.2)
Observations 177 177 177 177 223 145
R-squared 0.323 0.331 0.431 0.334 0.187 0.483
By deﬁnition only products with followers are included in the analysis. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All the speciﬁcations contain product ﬁxed eﬀects.Run in STATA on 18:04:40,
29 Apr 2010
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Table 8. Regressing quantities exported on pioneer dummies controlling by product-year shocks
log quantity exported by a ﬁrm in a product and year
All destinations Only ARG
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 if pioneer in
product
-1.108 -2.485** -3.250*** -2.707** -2.630***
(1.243) (1.085) (1.014) (1.076) (0.44)
tpf : experience exporting the product 0.880*** 1.025
(0.239) (0.808)
t2pf -0.0370
(0.0831)
Number of products exported by ﬁrm 0.287
(0.191)
Share of product in exports of ﬁrm 3.009
(2.629)
Constant 10.81*** 12.07*** 8.812*** 6.471*** 12.31**
(0.607) (0.612) (0.693) (1.851) (0.14)
Observations 179 90 179 179 33
R-squared 0.93 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.99
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .
Quantities are measured in the units in which the Customs transaction is
recorded. tpf corresponds to the experience exporting a given product.
Speciﬁcation (1) restricts to post entry events. Speciﬁcation (2) does it for
survivers of at least three seasons. Speciﬁcation (3) is like speciﬁcation (1) ,
but controlling for experience. Speciﬁcation (4) includes various additional
controls, like product diversiﬁcation and the share of the value exported in
the product as fraction of all exports, to measure the importance for the
product for the ﬁrm.
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Table 9. Regressing prices on pioneer dummies controlling by product-year shocks
log median export price of ﬁrm in a product in a year
(1) (2) (3)
Restriction tpf ≥ 1 tpf ≥ 2 tpf ≥ 3
1 if pioneer in product 0.0801 0.0460 0.0461
(0.0960) (0.0885) (0.0953)
Constant 1.749*** 1.789*** 1.707***
(0.0471) (0.0442) (0.0550)
Observations 179 128 90
R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.999
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1 .
tpf corresponds to the experience exporting a given product. Speciﬁcation (1)
restricts to post entry events. Speciﬁcation (2) does it for survivers of at least
two seasons , and speciﬁcation (3) for survivers of three seasons. This justiﬁes
the lower sample size as we move to the right. In a diﬀerent speciﬁcation without
including the pioneer dummy we see that almost all of the variation (by R2) is
taken up by the ﬁxed eﬀect, there is little ﬁrm level variation in prices.
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Table 10. Linear regression of ﬁrm's export value [log US$] taking product and year ﬁxed eﬀects
dependent variable: ﬁrm's export value [log US$]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 if pioneer in the product -3.338*** -3.391*** -2.250* -3.521*** -2.844**
(1.034) (0.968) (1.154) (0.926) (1.190)
log exported value at entry in
prod
0.803**
(0.396)
experience in product (years) 0.971** 0.880 0.345 0.923** 0.906**
(0.384) (0.958) (0.860) (0.360) (0.382)
experience in product squared 0.0141 0.0605
(0.115) (0.117)
N of products exported by
ﬁrm
0.249
(0.152)
Share of prod in ﬁrm's bundle 1.614
(2.818)
Constant 10.20*** 10.29*** 1.551 9.317*** 9.654***
(0.980) (1.390) (4.511) (1.131) (1.482)
Product- Year FE FE FE FE FE
Observations 204 204 204 204 204
R2 0.885 0.885 0.920 0.904 0.889
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
9 Appendix: New correspondence for HS commodity codes
1992-2006
To measure the decision to export a new product for the country it was necessary to homologate
HS6 product codes through time. The Harmonized System consists in close to 5000 product codes.
However once every 5 years the classiﬁcation is internationally updated. This implies that several
codes are expanded into new codes (i.e. what before could have been portable music players in
1990, could have been expanded into "portable cassette music players" and "portable CD music
players", and later on into "MP3 players"). Other codes are collapsed into a single code (i.e.
products that are seldom exported) or are taken out of the classiﬁcation. Some codes are just
relabeled. And there are combinations of the above (i.e. a code that becomes part of two diﬀerent
codes which encompass other codes that are absorbed by each new code). Thus, it is possible that
what we observe as new codes are not new products being exported but simply a new codiﬁcation
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of a product that could have been exported before under a diﬀerent code.
Given the above problem, what we need is a common clasiﬁcation across time. This was unavailable
in existing correspondences for HS classiﬁcations at 6 digits. Correspondences which can be ob-
tained, with diﬀerent access levels, from WTO, World Customs Organization, UN-COMTRADE,
and the World Bank, only allow to connect diﬀerent classiﬁcations, but do not provide unique
common product codes across time, which is what we need for our paper. In other words, what
they provide is a code by code correspondence between diﬀerent classiﬁcations. What we need,
however is to generate common codes across classiﬁcations . To the best of our knowledge, the only
work that recently provides this is Pierce and Schott (2009). In their technical paper they provide
a homologation procedure across time in order to have consistent codes for US HS 10-digit export
and import codes. Although we began working on this homologation before they published their
working paper, we have a similar program that shares the same principles of their product code
homologation: creating common unique codes for product codes that expand or contract through
time. We prefer our algorithm and program to theirs, because of the suitability of the data input
(we use 6 digit level full classiﬁcations) and the output that we needed (a single homologated HS
classiﬁcation ).
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The HS classiﬁcations considered: 1992, 1996 2002
Our data consists of a customs database for the period 1994-2006, which we complemented using
COMTRADE data since 1990. All the data is classiﬁed under the Harmonized System (HS)
codiﬁcation. However the period considers 3 diﬀerent classiﬁcations: HS1992, HS1996 and HS2002.
These were major reclassiﬁcations of codes which altered the codes in the way explained above 57.
This implies in practice that we need to homologate codes that changed from one classiﬁcation to
the other. There are two major changes: from HS1992 to HS1996 and from HS1996 to HS2002.
56We needed a procedure that considers 3 complete classiﬁcations and their correspondences (HS-1992 to HS-1996,
and HS 1996 to HS 2002) and that could provide us with a unique new classiﬁcation that could be corresponded to
each HS1992, 1996 and 2002 directly. Although using the same principle to concord classiﬁcations through time,
Pierce and Schott speciﬁc program was not ideally suited for what we needed because the input data they use, which
is the US HS 10 digit code changes, is incremental, providing a list of codes codes that change and (many) diﬀerent
dates in which they change. Our data consists of 2 full correspondences between 3 classiﬁcations which were better
handled with a diﬀerent code. In them, we had data of all codes of an old classiﬁcation and the corresponding
codes for the new classiﬁcation. This included codes that did not change through time. Also, the output that we
needed was a full correspondence of each original HS classiﬁcation with an homologated HS classiﬁcation which
would allow us to work directly the data with the homologated codes in our paper, and which the procedure of
Pierce and Schott did not provide directly.
57The only exception is HS1992, which is practically the same as the classiﬁcation that existed since 1990.
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The problem and an example
What we need to do is to avoid counting new codes if they are codes that appeared due to a
reclassiﬁcation. We also need to take into account cases of products that are collapsed into a
single code, since we do not know if the new code exists due to which old product. This implies
that whenever there is an expansion of codes we need to consider the original code as the correct
code, and when there is a collapse of codes we need to consider the new code as the correct and
unique code. Since there could be combinations of both and multiple collapses into one product,
the most conservative way of avoiding reclassiﬁcation is an iterative collapsing of codes into a
"minimum common code" that subsumes all codes that could reclassiﬁed in one or another code
category.
For example, Table 11 shows what the procedure would do to the following codes:
Table 11. Example of product homologation procedure
HS92 HS96 Final Code
011100 011200 011200
011200 011200 011200
HS92 HS96 Final Code
150140 150150 150140
150140 150160 150140
HS92 HS96 Final Code
140400 140400 200199
140400 140600 200199
140500 140500 200199
200199 140400 200199
200199 140500 200199
In the ﬁrst set of codes we have two codes that collapse into one. The ﬁnal code then must be the
merged code since we cannot know if it came from the ﬁrst or second code. The second set shows
a split. Since we cannot know if the code in HS92 was 150150 or 150160 we have to consider the
most aggregated one. The third case is a little more complicated. 140400 is split, 140500 is not,
but 200199 is incorporated into 140400 and 140500. The minimum common code in this case is
20019958. The process of generating a minimum common code must be iterative and must be done
also across more than one classiﬁcation (must be done also considering HS2002 codes).
The procedure Following analogous principles to Pierce and Schott (2009), but before they
published their work, we built a STATA code59 that ﬁrst takes two classiﬁcations (for example HS92
and HS96) and collapses into a single code any original codes that have expanded or contracted
58For example, lets assume that a ﬁrm starts exporting a code 140500 in 1998, under HS96. How can we know if
that export corresponds to actually a new product or an old 200199 code? Since it is impossible we need to collapse
the code to avoid the chance of wrong classiﬁcation of new codes as new products.
59We are thankful to Alex Culiuc, who kindly provided the central portions of this STATA do ﬁle. We found
helpful to explain the code here so the reader have a better understanding of it. The ﬁles will also be available on
the web appendix.
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between both classiﬁcations. In the example of table 11, it allocates three unique codes to each of
the three examples depicted in the table60. The same is then done for the next two classiﬁcations
(HS96 and HS02). We thus end up with two new hybrid product classiﬁcations, one that uniﬁes
hs92-hs96 and another for hs96-hs02. We join both new codiﬁcations using the HS96 codes as
connectors (which are common in both uniﬁed classiﬁcations), allowing us to have a correspondence
between the two, and we repeat the process one more time. This allows us to have a ﬁnal unique
code throughout the period 1990-2006.
Caveats and limitations The main limitation of this procedure is that it requires collapsing
many diﬀerent codes into single ones, signiﬁcantly reducing the number of codes available for
analysis, since it collapses any codes that are expanded or contracted across classiﬁcations. The
consequence is that we lose several and potential relevant disaggregated information.
Downloading the data The correspondence ﬁles are available on the author's website under
the name transcode_XX.dta where XX is the year of the original HS.
60We use actual HS codes as minimum common code in cases of simple expansion or contraction of codes. For
cases of complex code grouping the chosen code is the code with the highest exported value in the group, for the
whole sample period.
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10 Appendix: Filters used to deﬁne new export products.
Empirically understanding what is a new export is not trivial. On the one hand , if we deﬁne a
new product too loosely, then it would be very diﬃcult to ﬁnd any learning, since we would be
having a low share of true new products in our sample, because we expect learning to take a place
disproportionally in truly new products, as one could infer from Foster and Rosenzweig (2010) .
On the other hand, if we are too tough with the deﬁnition of a new product, then the number of
cases would dramatically shrink. In this trade oﬀ between distillation of new products for the
country and the quantity of products, we tried to lean towards distillation as much as possible,
but still keeping enough observations to make the results statistically signiﬁcant. The following
table details the ﬁlters, their eﬀect on arguably true new products and in the sample size.
Review of how the ﬁlters impact the new ﬁrms and the number of products
Competing Goals
Filters to deﬁne product as new
for the country.
Have a high share
of true new
products in sample
Have a sample of
products as large as
possible
Comments
For 1990
∑
f xpf ≤ X (for 1990 only
aggregate but no ﬁrm data)
X =
US$1, 000
+ − risk of re-exports
Only considering exports post 1991 by
producer ﬁrms (traders do not count)
{careful with closed ﬁrms w/o tax
activity code !!}
+ − Traders are important but out
of scope of paper
Re-exports are not counted as export
(xpfy > θmpfy): Higher θ
θ = 2 +if θnot too large −
Drop products with description
containing others and NES.
+ -
Cutoﬀ xpfy >≥ X in pre-sample
(1991 to 1994)
X =
US$1, 000
- + If X =0 here ; then almost no
products are left
Cutoﬀ xpfy ≥ X in sample (1995 to
2006)
X =? + -
Implausible jump ﬁlter (for machinery) + - Has some ad-hoc component in
its deﬁnition
Export transactions per year to be
considered.
xpfy ≥ 2 +
To avoid returnd
(especially machines)
−
Can lose products with
single transaction
Bias towards less failure
11 Proofs
This appendix works out the proofs for existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium of the type we
are interested.
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11.1 Detailed derivations of the setup
11.1.1 Value of being pioneer
Value of entering immediately for any ﬁrm is proportional to q. Namely V ipioneer = −Fq +
βEmax {0, [x− c] q}; which in the case of Uniform distribution becomes:
1
q
V ipioneer = −F + β
{
1
2
(1− c)2
}
(5)
11.1.2 Value of being follower
The value of waiting is going to be diﬀerent for diﬀerent ﬁrms.
1
q
V small iwait = βEmax {0,−F + β [x− c]}
; which we can manipulate. Deﬁning making for simplicity θ ≡ F
β
+ c we get:
1
q
V small iwait = β
2 [Emax {θ, x} − θ] (6)
The expected value above can be decomposed and get
1
q
V small iwait = β
2 [{θ × Pr (x ≤ θ) + E [x|x > θ]× Pr (x > θ)} − θ]
Using the Uniform(0, 1) distribution for x and various algebraic manipulations we get
1
q
V small iwait = β
2
[
1
2
(1 + θ)2
]
(7)
Note that Equation 7 is is similar to Equation 5 , but with two main diﬀerences. First, the cutoﬀ
for entry after uncertainty is revealed, θ ≡ F
β
+ c > c , is larger than the cutoﬀ for continuation
in the project when the entry cost is already sunk. After the information is reveled, the decision
to enter simply uses the standard NPV criteria to enter, since there is no option value of waiting
after xi is revealed . The second diﬀerence is that the project is pushed one period into the future,
so there is additional discounting.
This is slightly more complex, because the distribution of order statistic x¯ ≡ max{xA, xB}is not
uniform. We can start with the same Eq 6, but now adapting to the fact that we care about the
probability distribution of x¯
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1q
V largewait = β
2 [Emax {θ, x¯} − θ] (8)
To move forward we need the expectation of the maximum, which can be computed analytically
if we assume that the iid. distribution of xi is standard uniform. Although the model is for a
potential scope s = 2, we will calculate the results for any positive (integer) potential scope s.
To calculate the expectation, we can use the fact that the k-th order statistic of N iid draws
from a Uniform(0, 1) is distributed according to the Betapdf (k, [N + 1− k]) probability density
function. In our case, we are interested in the maximum N ≡ s (i.e. the s-th order statistic).
Thus x¯ (s) ∼ Betapdf (s, 1). In particular the expected value of interest is61:
E (max {θ; x¯ (s)}) = Betacdf (θ, s, 1) θ + (1−Betacdf (θ, s, 1))E [x¯ (s) |x¯ (s) > θ] (9)
; where Betacdf (y, s, 1)is the cumulative density function of a variable y distributed Betapdf (N, 1).
In practice, this cumulative density of the Beta distribution is given by the Regularized Incomplete
Beta Function, which in this case is 62
Betacdf (θ, s, 1) = Iθ(s, 1) = θ
s (10)
With this we solve for the probability weights in Equation 9: Pr (x¯ (s) ≤ θ) = θs ; so Pr (x¯ (s) > θ) =
1 − θs. The only unsolved portion in Equation 9 is the expectation E [x¯ (s) |x¯ (s) > θ] , which is
the expected value of the beta distribution of xmax (s) when but left-truncated at θ. Following the
deﬁnition this expectation becomes:
E [x¯ (s) |x¯ (s) > θ] =
∫ 1
θ
x¯ (s)Betapdf (x
max (s) , s, 1)dxmax (s)∫ 1
θ
Betapdf (xmax (s) , s, 1)dxmax (s)
; where the density function is deﬁned by63 Betapdf (x; s, 1) =
xs−1∫ 1
0 u
s−1du
= x
s−1
[ 1sus]|10
= x
s−1
s−1 = sx
s−1.
Replacing this we get 64
61We are just using the law of total probability to express
E (max {θ; x¯ (s)}) = Pr (x¯ (s) ≤ θ) θ + Pr (x¯ (s) > θ)E [x¯ (s) |x¯ (s) > c]
62The Regularized Incomplete Beta Function with parameters y, a and b is Iy(a, b) =
∑a+b−1
j=a
(a+b−1)!
j!(a+b−1−j)!y
j(1−
y)a+b−1−j . Also, Iy(a, b) =
B(y;a,b)
B(a,b) =
∫ y
0
ta−1(1−t)b−1dt∫ 1
0
ta−1(1−t)b−1dt . Where B(y; a, b) is the Incomplete Beta Function
B(y; a, b) =
∫ y
0
ta−1(1 − t)b−1dt ; and B(a, b) is the Beta function B(a, b) = ∫ 1
0
ta−1(1 − t)b−1dt (which is not the
same as the beta probability density function!). Mechanically applying the function to this problem yields
Ic(s, 1) =
s∑
j=s
s!
j!(s− j)!c
j(1− c)s−j = s!
s!0!
cs(1− c)0
63In general, the beta distribution with parameters a and b for a random variable y is Betapdf (y;α, β) =
yα−1(1−y)β−1∫ 1
0
uα−1(1−u)β−1du
64As one should expect, the denominator of Equation 11bounded between zero and one; while the numerator is
smaller than the denominator, because xmax (s) < s , since x¯ (s) ∈ [0, 1] , while s ≥ 1. This is a sanity check that
the expectation is smaller than one, which ought to be the case since x ∼ Uniform(0, 1).
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E [x¯ (s) |x¯ (s) > θ] =
∫ 1
θ
x¯ (s) s [x¯ (s)]s−1 dx¯ (s)∫ 1
θ
s [x¯ (s)]s−1 dx¯ (s)
(11)
; which implies 65
Emax {θ, x¯ (s)} = θ
s+1 + s
s+ 1
(12)
Note that for θ = 0 and this corresponds to the standard maximum of s uniform random variables,
s
s+1
, and when θ = 1 the expected value is one. Both extreme conditions are reassuring of our
calculations.
Now we have enough ingredients to re write Equation 8
1
q
V largewait = β
2
[
θs+1 + s
s+ 1
− θ
]
(13)
11.2 Existence of equilibrium
Here we show the existence of an equilibrium for our model in Section 2, in wich two ﬁrms that
have potential scope in new products s = 1 and one large ﬁrm has potential scope s = 2 . In some
cases, we will show the more general calculations for s > 2. The value functions to for a ﬁrm of
potential scope s in new activities is proportional to:
Vpioneer =− F + β
{
1
2
(1− c)2
}
Vwait(s) =β
2
[
θs+1 + s
s+ 1
− θ
]
11.2.1 Decision to pioneer or wait by the small ﬁrm
The small ﬁrm will enter if β2
[
1
2
(1− θ)2] < −F + β [1
2
(1− c)2], which after some manipulations
becomes:
1 <
(1− β)
(
1− 2
(
F
β
+ c
)
+ c2
)
F
(
F
β
+ c
) (14)
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E [xmax (s) |xmax (s) > θ] =
(
1
1− θs
)
s
∫ 1
θ
x¯ (s)
s
dx¯ (s) =
(
1
1− θs
)
s
s+ 1
[
x¯ (s)
s+1
] ∣∣∣1
θ
=
(
1
1− θs
)
s
s+ 1
[
1− θs+1]
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For the special case of with c = 0 , Inequality 14 becomes
F < (1− β)
(
β
F
− 2
)
; since F is restricted to be positive, we need β
F
> 2 ; which can be obtained with β close to one
(high patience, but not inﬁnite) , and F close to zero. For example F = 0.1 and β = 0.9 yields a
possible case. The search for all the cases for which this is true is available on Figure 2
11.2.2 Decision to pioneer or wait by the large ﬁrm
The decision to enter will depend on
V largewait < V
i
pioneer
β2
[
θs+1 + s
s+ 1
− θ
]
< −F + β
{
1
2
(1− c)2
}
(15)
For s = 2 this becomes[
2
3
β +
2
3
β
(
F
β
+ c
)3
− F − βc− 1
2
+ c− c2
]
< −F
β
Figure 2 performs a gridsearch to deﬁne the the region of parameters for which this the case.
11.3 Proof of uniqueness of equilibrium
In the speciﬁcation above we focused on ﬁrms' strategies if they know for sure that another ﬁrm will
enter in the next period. Here we relax this assumption to show that for the region of parameters
Ω = Ω1 ∪ Ω2 deﬁned in Proposition 1 and Figure 2 the assumption that at least one ﬁrm enters
as pioneer is without loss of generality. Interestingly, we will show that the equilibrium deﬁned in
Proposition 1 is unique for the (endogenous) region Ω2
To generalize the setup of section 11.1 let's denote by pj as the (endogenous) probability that ﬁrm
j enters as pioneer, while p˜−j denotes the belief that the other ﬁrm enters as pioneer. Then the
value functions for a ﬁrm of type ϕ become:
1
q (ϕ)
V ipioneer = −F + βEmax {0, [x− c] q} (16)
1
q (ϕ)
Vwait (ϕ) = p˜−j × β2
[
θs(ϕ)+1 + s (ϕ)
s (ϕ) + 1
− θ
]
+ (1− p˜−j) β 1
q (ϕ)
max
{
V ipioneer, 0
}
(17)
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The diﬀerence with the previous setup is that the expected value of waiting depends on the beliefs
that a given ﬁrm may have with respect of what the other ﬁrm will do. We will concentrate in
the case where {β, F} ∈ Ω2, as deﬁned in Proposition 1. To prove the argument by contradiction
we will also assume, contrary to Proposition 1, that the large ﬁrm believes the small ﬁrm may not
enter as pioneer for sure: 0 ≤ p˜small < 1 ; where p˜small represents the belief that the large ﬁrm has
about the entry of the small ﬁrm.
From section 11.2 we know that in region Ω = Ω1 ∪ Ω2 it is a dominant strategy for the small
ﬁrm to enter immediately, even if it knows for sure that somebody else will be entering as pioneer.
That means, even with the belief p˜large = 1 , the small ﬁrm still prefers to enter immediately. Of
course, in the case with p˜large = 0 it will also want to enter, because there is no reason to wait and
delay potential proﬁts without a beneﬁt from better information. By continuity of the expected
proﬁt function in Equation 17, then for any belief p˜large ∈ [0, 1], the small ﬁrm will play strategy
psmall = 1 as a dominant strategy if {β, F} ∈ Ω. As a result, it would be an inconsistent belief for
the large ﬁrm to expect p˜small < 1 . This concludes our proof by contradiction of the uniqueness of
equilibrium in region Ω, with p˜small = psmall = 1 as the unique rational belief about the small ﬁrm
entry pattern. Interestingly, this makes the assumption that at least one ﬁrm enters as pioneer,
made in section 11 to be without loss of generality in equilibrium. Since psmall = 1 , the unique
dominant strategy of the large ﬁrm in region Ω2 is to wait (plarge = 0) , since by deﬁnition of Ω2
V largewait > V
i
pioneer. The equilibrium is then unique. q.e.d.
11.4 Proofs of predictions
11.4.1 Proof of prediction 1
Across products, the unconditional probability of follower entry in the most successful sector
is Pr [x > θ]= 1 − F
βq
− c ; while the probability of entry in that same sector conditional on
pioneer survival is Pr
[
x > θ
∣∣∣x > c]= 1c (1− Fβ − c) > Pr [x > θ]. Thus, the probability of having
a follower is positively related to the success of the pioneer.
11.4.2 Proof of prediction 2
It follows directly from Proposition 1 , because small ﬁrms will be pioneers exporting q , while
larger ﬁrms enter as followers exporting q¯.
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